Anti-politics, the early Marx and Gramsci’s ‘integral state’ by Humphrys, ET
THESIS ELEVEN 
 1 
Anti-politics, the Early Marx and Gramsci’s ‘Integral State’  
Elizabeth Humphrys, University of Technology Sydney 
 
Abstract 
This paper traces a line of theorisation regarding the state-civil society relationship, from 
Marx’s early writings to Gramsci’s conception of the integral state. The paper argues that 
Marx developed, through his critique of Hegel, a valuable understanding of the state-civil 
society connection that emphasised the antagonism between them in capitalist societies. 
Alternatively, Gramsci’s conception of the ‘integral state’ posits an interconnection and 
dialectical unity of the state and civil society, where the latter is integrated under the 
leadership of the former. The paper argues that while Marx and Gramsci’s positions are, at 
first, seemingly incongruous ideas—as to the ‘separation’ in Marx and ‘integration’ in 
Gramsci—this tension can be bridged when the integral state is understood as being always 
necessarily unstable. The paper argues that this framework can help us understand the 
contemporary breakdown of political rule in the phenomenon known as ‘anti-politics’.  
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This paper traces a line of theorisation regarding the state-civil society relationship in 
Marx’s early writings and through Gramsci’s conception of the integral state in the Prison 
Notebooks. Marx developed, through his critique of Hegel, a valuable understanding of the 
state-civil society relationship that emphasised the antagonism between the state and civil 
society in capitalist societies. Gramsci provided an essential elaboration of the 
relationship between civil society and state in the era of mass representative politics, and 
his conception of the integral state can help draw out the complex contradictions and 
interconnections between capitalist social relations, civil society, political society and the 
state apparatus. The paper offers a bridging of these accounts—as to the ‘separation’ in 
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Marx and ‘integration’ in Gramsci—of the state-civil society relationship. The paper does 
not propose an all-encompassing theory of the state or politics, but instead argues that 
the bridged account provides a useful framework from which to analyse the 
contemporary breakdown of politics that characterised the era of mass politics—in the 
phenomenon known as anti-politics. Such an approach is considered a productive 
addition to current analysis of anti-politics in particular, asking not simply why anti-
politics developed over the last decades but why we did not have it earlier.  
The first section of this paper considers Marx’s critique of Hegel on the state, law and 
politics, before considering Marx’s argument regarding the separation and antagonism 
between the state and civil society developed in his writings of the mid-1840s. Section 
two considers Gramsci’s conception of the integral state, through which he argued there 
is an interconnection and dialectical unity of the state and civil society—integrating the 
latter under the leadership of the former. The analysis then considers in section three the 
tension between these positions, concluding that the distance between the accounts is 
bridged when the integral state is understood as being always necessarily unstable. This is 
because a state based on an atomistic and internally divided civil society cannot ever fully 
overcome the logic of the fundamental social relations that produce those contradictions. 
The article concludes, in section four, by examining the phenomenon known as anti-
politics, in order to demonstrate the usefulness of this approach in analysing politics in 
the contemporary period. Anti-politics is understood as the increasing detachment from, 
and hostility to, political parties and the political system. The paper outlines how this 
framework can explain not only why there is growing hostility to formal politics, but how 
the operations of politics have successfully ensured that resentment and opposition has 
been largely muted for a prolonged historical period.  
Marx, the state and civil society 
Marx developed a valuable understanding of the state-civil society relationship in his 
early writings, in the course of a critique of the conceptions of Hegel and certain of 
Hegel’s followers. While some scholarship asserts that Marx abandoned, broke with or 
superseded his early conceptions of the state in his more ‘mature’ writings (Balakrishnan, 
2014, 2015), the analysis here draws on Colletti (1975) and his argument that Marx’s later 
theorisation involved a deepening and enhancement of his initial critique of politics and 
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the state via the critique of political economy—that is, the critique of the (alienated and 
exploitative) capitalist social relations that produce bourgeois civil society. This paper 
does not propose an all encompassing Marxist approach to the state and politics, but 
instead argues that the approach Marx took in his Early Writing continues to provide a 
useful framework for thinking about the state–civil society relationship. This is especially 
so when supplemented with Gramsci’s conception of the integral state—which was also 
developed, in part, via a critical engagement with Hegel.  
At the heart of Marx’s social critique was what those who followed him often called 
‘historical materialism’, an approach that contended not only that any given society had 
to be understood in terms of the determinate relationships between living human beings 
(his theory’s materialism), but that the temporally-specific arrangement of social relations 
of production shaped the entire society in which they dominated (its historicism). In the 
third volume of Capital, Marx (1991: 927–928)) wrote: 
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct 
producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as this grows directly 
out of production itself and reacts back upon it in turn as a determinant. On this is based 
the entire configuration of the economic community arising from the actual relations of 
production, and hence also its specific political form. It is in each case the direct 
relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate 
producers—a relationship whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of 
development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social productive power—in which we 
find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the 
political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the specific 
form of the state in each case. This does not prevent the same economic basis—the 
same in its major conditions—from displaying endless variations of innumerable 
different empirical circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations, historical influences 
acting outside, etc., and these can only be understood by analysing these empirically 
given conditions. 
This statement, among others in Marx’s ‘mature’ writings, makes explicit that he saw the 
form of the state in any given mode of production as specific to that mode of production. 
This is because, in any such social formation, one form of exploitative social relations of 
production dominates over others (Banaji, 2010). Thus, those dominant social relations 
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‘assign rank and influence to the others’ and the form of production ‘is a general 
illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity’ (Marx, 
1973: 107). But such statements are unclear on how to theorise what relationship the 
state and politics have to capitalist social relations more generally. This has led many 
Marxists to contend that Marx himself never completed a theory of the capitalist state, in 
particular because he never completed his planned volume of Capital on this topic—in 
which he would presumably have expounded his view at a more concrete level of analysis 
than the highly abstract critique of political economy in the first three volumes (Hay, 
1999; Jessop, 1990).  
Bob Jessop (1982: 1) has stated that there are ‘discontinuities and disjunctions’ in the 
work of Marx on the state, and that this ‘incompleteness and indeterminacy account for 
the wide range of so-called Marxist theories of the state’. Jessop (ibid 1982: 2–31) has 
argued that aspects of the writings of Marx and Engels can be found to support 
competing claims that the state is an ‘instrument of class rule’, a ‘factor of cohesion’ and 
‘an institutional ensemble’. This, he has claimed, means that despite Marxists long 
claiming special knowledge of the state’s strategic significance, debate has often been 
‘esoteric’ and disconnected from those writing in other traditions. Thus, despite Marx’s 
frequent journalistic and polemical writings on contemporary politics and actually 
existing states, it has been argued he never produced a coherent theory of the modern 
state, based in his most important lifework: the critique of political economy. 
While acknowledging the unfinished nature of Marx’s project analysing the 
contemporary state, in some of his earliest theoretical writings—in the years 1842–1847 
in particular—Marx did lay down an important and relatively comprehensive theory of 
the state and politics (see Teeple, 1984 for a systematic account of these writings). 
Moreover, this theorisation provides an incisive and useful approach to understanding 
the relationship between the state and civil society, and one that can assist in analysing 
the rise of anti-politics. The following section locates the origin of Marx’s views in his 
critique of Hegel’s doctrine of the state, before defining the most relevant components 
of Marx’s theory and integrating these with his subsequent critique of capitalist social 
relations. This line of exploration then facilitates comparison with Gramsci’s conception 
of the integral state. 
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Marx’s critique of Hegel 
Marx’s starting point in the early 1840s was a critical engagement with Hegel. Contrary to 
the view among some Marxists that Marx’s ‘youthful’ writings are predominantly 
‘philosophical’ in content and follow Hegel by being ‘idealist’ in method (Althusser, 
2005; cf Teeple, 1984), Marx (1975e) himself lauded Hegel’s contribution to a materialist 
understanding of the state. Marx agreed with Hegel (1967) when the latter insisted that 
because modern (bourgeois) civil society is atomistic and composed of competing 
particular, private, individual interests, there is a necessary separation between civil 
society and the universal or common social interest implied in the form of the state. 
Hegel argued that modern society allowed individual freedom unthinkable in previous 
social formations, but also recognised that the constant competition between private 
individuals in civil society—Hobbes’s (1997) ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’ or ‘war of all 
against all’—produced unceasing social instability. He argued this necessitated some kind 
of organism to hold society together: the modern state. 
While Marx saw Hegel as the most advanced theorist of the modern state, he took Hegel 
to task for claiming that the state could truly express the universal social interest. For 
Hegel, the legislature mediated between a civil society of particular interests and the 
modern representative state embodying universal interests. But for Marx the legislature 
was incapable of bridging the divide between individual and universal interests, and 
instead brought out that contradiction—because ‘it is the antinomy of political state and 
civil society, the contradiction of the abstract political state with itself’ (1975b: 158). In 
other words, Marx identified that the antagonism between civil society and the state was 
unable to be resolved, precisely because in a society composed of competing particular 
interests, the state itself would be just another particular interest—even if in a formal or 
abstract way it claimed to stand for the general or collective interest of the society that it 
governed over.  
Marx and Engels made the more general point that in every class society, the state—no 
matter what its specific relationship to the rest of society—was the political form of class 
rule. Marx and Engels (1976: 98) defined the historically contingent development of a 
specifically bourgeois civil society thus: 
Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite 
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stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and 
industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the State and the nation, though, 
on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its external relations as nationality and 
internally must organise itself as state. The word ‘civil society’ [bürgerliche Gesellschaft] 
emerged in the eighteenth century, when property relations had already extricated 
themselves from the ancient and medieval community. Civil society as such only 
develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organisation evolving directly out of production 
and intercourse, which in all ages forms the basis of the state and of the rest of the 
idealistic superstructure, has, however, always been designated by the same name. 
Furthermore, the nature of the capitalist class in bourgeois society was that it was itself 
internally divided by competition. Therefore it required a state that was formally separate 
from its individual members and standing ‘over against’ them (Marx and Engels, 1976: 
83–84), and where ‘all common institutions are set up with the help of the state and are 
given a political form’ (ibid 1976: 99).  
It follows that the historic uniqueness of bourgeois society was that the capitalist class 
ruled politically via a state that was formally separate from the private existence of that 
class’s individual members, each one of whom already ruled socially in their respective 
firm or business. As a result, capitalist class political rule appeared as its own opposite. 
Thus, the state appeared to stand over all of society, including the capitalist class, in the 
general interest.  
Marx argued that Hegel’s error was that he missed seeing the fundamental basis of the 
state as an estranged expression of civil society, but that this relationship exists in 
inverted form in reality—in other words, the state appears to be prior to civil society, and 
politics appears to dominate and drive social relations. Hegel, Marx stated (1975e: 64), 
was ‘not to be blamed for depicting the nature of the modern state as it is, but rather for 
presenting what is as the essence of the state’. Put another way, Marx concluded that it was 
not that Hegel’s description inverted what was really happening, but that social reality 
existed in an inverted and mystified form, because of the dominance of capitalist social 
relations, and that Hegel did not see this.  
Marx located the sharp separation between the state and civil society, and between 
political and social relations, as emerging historically with the rise of capitalist modernity. 
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Marx (1975b: 90) stated that the ‘abstraction of the state as such … was not created until 
modern times. The abstraction of the political state is a modern product’. Modern civil 
society could, therefore, only organise itself as a state on the basis of this separation. 
Furthermore, the abstraction of politics from civil society in the form of a state involved 
the depoliticisation of civil society (1975c). Colletti (1975: 34) has summarised Marx’s 
analysis as depending on the coincident nature of ‘the estrangement of individuals from 
each other, or privacy within society, and the more general estrangement of public from 
private, or of the state from society’. This antagonism meant that for Marx the notion of 
‘political representation’ is a misnomer. As soon as individuals deputed from civil society 
enter the state, they stop being deputies and instead become part of the abstract state. In 
so doing, the role of political representatives changes to one of furthering the interests of 
the state—and the political society around it—over the interests of those sections of civil 
society from which they emerged (Marx, 1975b).  
This aspect of Marx’s argument can throw light on the limits of political representation 
of social interests within social democratic or labourist parties. It also illuminates how 
historical debates over the extent of ‘relative autonomy of the capitalist state’, by 
Poulantzas (2001) and others (Panitch and Gindin, 2012), might be misplaced. This is 
because the state is both fully separate from bourgeois civil society—and, moreover, 
operates on the basis of a political logic that is antagonistic to social logic—yet is also 
entirely dependent on the perpetuation of the specifically bourgeois civil society from 
which the state is abstracted. 
Nevertheless, while Marx rejected Hegel’s notion that the state could truly represent the 
general interest, he did argue there was no other social force that could act across an 
entire society to attempt to manage the common interests of the capitalist class. This was 
why Marx and Engels (1976) called the state ‘an illusory community’: not because it 
wasn’t real, but because it was not a true community of the individuals who formed its 
social basis. In considering and citing Marx’s point in The German Ideology, Colletti argued 
(1975: 88): 
The collective interest … ‘takes an independent form as the State, divorced from the real 
interests of the individual and community’, insofar as ‘just because individuals seek only 
their particular interest which for them does not coincide with their communal 
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interest—in fact, the general is the illusory form of communal life—the latter will be 
imposed on them as an interest “alien” to them and “independent” of them, as in its 
turn a particular, peculiar “general” interest.’ Hence ‘the social power’ transformed into 
the power of the state ‘appears to these individuals … not as their own united power, 
but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are 
ignorant’. 
Thus, for Marx, there were severe limits on what the state could do to further the 
management of shared interests for two reasons. The first was that in a society of 
irreconcilable particular interests, at best the state could enforce some kind of 
hypothetical ‘average’ of those different interests (Marx, 1975b). The second was that the 
modern state’s basis in bourgeois society meant that it could never challenge the 
fundamental social relations that produced such a society—relations based on bourgeois 
private property—lest it risk eradicating the basis for its own existence (Marx, 1975a). 
Thus, the state could at best manage or administer problems produced by capitalist social 
relations differently, but never directly challenge the sources of those social harms. 
From critique of politics to critique of political economy 
Marx’s (1975d: 425) theoretical critique of the state and politics led him to the next stage 
in the development of his social analysis: 
My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political forms could 
be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general 
development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material 
conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of English and 
French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the term ‘civil society’; that 
the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy. 
From the early studies in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844 to the conclusions of the three 
volumes of Capital, Marx located the basis for the specific nature of civil society in 
capitalist social relations—that is, in the process of abstraction of value in the 
exploitation of labour power. Yet, as Colletti (1973: 232–233) has noted, Marx employed 
a corresponding approach in both his critique of the state and his critique of political 
economy. In the former, Marx attacked the speculative aspects of Hegel’s philosophy of 
the state, by contrasting the abstract form of the state with its concrete basis in civil 
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society. Marx thereby revealed how Hegel had uncritically accepted mystified forms 
precisely because he engaged in the ‘crassest materialism’ and had not pierced the essence 
of the matter (see also Marx, 1975b: 174). In the latter, Marx attacked the political 
economists for accepting the mystified, fetishised forms of appearance of capitalist social 
relations at face value, rather than grasping their basis in concrete relationships between 
real individuals (see also Marx, 1976: 163–177). In each case reality itself is upside down 
and must be turned right side up through practical activity.  
From Marx to Gramsci 
The century from Marx’s death to the beginning of the neoliberal era, in the crisis that 
ended the long boom, was marked by a tremendous growth in the social weight and 
apparent importance of the state and political society to the functioning of modern 
capitalist societies. So much so that, for workers’ movements in advanced Western 
countries, talk of a separation or antagonism between state and civil society would seem 
divorced from the experience of mass trade unions, electorally successful social 
democratic parties, and large-scale state intervention in capitalist economic life. In that 
sense, representation of the social interests of civil society actors in politics and the state 
could seem not only to have been nearly completely won, but also to have overcome the 
antinomies that Marx described. Such a view might rest on what seemed incontrovertible 
empirical evidence during the long post-war boom: unions with power to demand higher 
wages; a social democratic ‘consensus’ or Western model of development that could 
deliver full employment; a rapidly-growing welfare state; and ‘Keynesian’ policies that 
appeared to have all but eliminated capitalism’s tendency to crisis. However, these pieces 
of ‘evidence’ would be challenged and eventually buried in practice, by the return of 
capitalist crisis from the early 1970s and the state-led responses to it in the form of 
neoliberalism (Humphrys, 2018).  
While Marx could only have seen small clues of such tumultuous changes, Gramsci 
analysed the early decades of mass representative politics in his attempt to theorise the 
revolutionary potential of ‘the West’ (and its failure to be realised) in the wake of World 
War One. This necessitated an understanding of the concrete changes in the state–civil 
society relationship occasioned by these historic shifts. Like Marx, Gramsci’s starting 
point was to engage with Hegel’s conceptions and to build on them, using the toolbox 
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provided by those of Marx’s writings that were available at that time. Because many of 
Marx’s key theoretical expositions regarding the state and politics were unpublished 
when Gramsci set about composing his Prison Notebooks (2011), he often couldn’t rely on 
Marx’s positions from those texts. Thus, while Gramsci sought to develop his theory as 
closely as possible to Marx’s approach, some tensions become apparent in the course of 
mapping out Gramsci’s conception of the integral state. 
Lo stato integrale 
A key contention of this paper is that Gramsci developed insights geared to explaining 
the state–civil society relationship, which had changed during the historically delimited 
era of mass politics in advanced bourgeois societies. The theoretical framework for 
understanding how this took place is Gramsci’s conception of the integral state, which is 
‘a network of social relations for the production of consent, for the integration of the 
subaltern classes into the expansive project of historical development of the leading 
social group’ (Thomas, 2009: 143).  
The concept of the integral state first elaborated in the Prison Notebooks was a distinct 
innovation, not drawn from Gramsci’s predecessors, but built on the foundation of 
insights by Hegel and Marx. Gramsci was also attempting to redefine Marxism in the 
wake of the Great War: not so much ‘against’ Marx, but hostile to particular brands of 
‘Marxism’. Such writings were in critique of ‘interpretive traditions within and outside 
Marxism: both Second International and Stalinist instrumentalisations’ (Thomas, 2009: 
97).  
Gramsci analysed the complex and interrelated mechanisms of consent and coercive rule 
under capitalism. Sections of the Notebooks examine the winning of consent (‘hegemony’) 
and the coercive aspect of rule (‘domination’), and how these distinctions allow the 
capitalist state to rule in a way that defends the dominant social relations. Gramsci was 
not only concerned with how accumulation occurs and how the integral state might try 
to ensure that this continues; he was also concerned with how the character of 
production and accumulation—and the civil society which arises from this—lead to 
contradictions that allow openings for hegemonic struggles by subaltern groups against 
capitalist class rule.  
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The analysis above emphasised Marx’s elucidation of the sharp separation of and 
antagonism between civil society and the state, and the political society that exists around 
the latter. Marx also emphasised the depoliticisation of civil society produced by this 
separation. Gramsci’s conception of the integral state is an expanded understanding of 
how the state and political society come to lead or direct civil society politically. Rather 
than seeing the state as genuinely universalising in its project, Gramsci argued, like Marx, 
that the integral state is a process of capitalist class domination and hegemony. This 
aspect of Gramsci’s argument is frequently overlooked in the secondary literature 
(Morton, 2007: 89), yet the integral state was a conception that Gramsci developed 
specifically as part of a critique of the liberal conception of the ‘separation of powers’ 
(ibid 2007). 
For Gramsci, the integral state concept described the particular relationship between the 
state (political society and the state apparatus) on the one hand, and civil society 
(atomised social interests and the relations between them) on the other. He conceived 
the integral state not as an ‘identity’ between the two (i.e. the same as each other), nor as 
a ‘fusion’ (i.e. distinct but in union)—but rather as a dialectical unity (Thomas, 2009: 69). 
He deployed a specific understanding of this dialectical unity as a process of 
envelopment or enwrapping (involucro) of civil society by political society. As Peter 
Thomas (2009: 189) has explained: 
[T]he definition of political society as an ‘involucro’ in which a civil society can be 
developed would not seem to correspond in any sense to the concept of the state 
apparatus; for, whereas the latter is normally conceived as a coercive instrument applied 
externally in order to regulate civil society’s inherent tendency towards anarchy, Gramsci 
here presents the image of ‘political society’ as a ‘container’ of civil society, surrounding 
or enmeshing and fundamentally reshaping it.  
In summary, there is a more complex interplay of economic, political and institutional 
forms to create an ‘integral unity of capitalist state power’ (2009: 94–95) and Gramsci is 
attempting to think through the question of the state specifically in advanced capitalist 
countries (‘the West’) (Fiori, 1973: 242–243). 
Within the integral state conception, processes of consent (hegemony) in civil society are 
just as important as openly coercive state rule (domination). For Gramsci, conceiving of 
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the state as something that simply sits above civil society, involved in regulation and 
coercion alone—even through democratic means—overlooks that it is in practice a 
‘complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only 
justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those 
over whom it rules (Gramsci, 1971: 244; Q15 §10). Thus: 
… the general notion of the [s]tate includes elements which need to be referred back to 
the notion of civil society … in the sense that one might say that the State = political 
society + civil society, in other words hegemony armoured with coercion (Gramsci, 
1971: 263; Q6 §88). 
Far from civil society and political society only being in contradistinction, civil society is 
(in Gramsci’s conception) in dialectical unity with the state. Civil society and political 
society are better conceptualised not as geographical locations, but as different sites of 
social practice: civil society is the location of hegemonic practice and political society is 
the site of direct domination. Further, the state apparatus plays: 
… an important role in concretising this unifying supplement to civil society’s 
constitutive divided particularity—but the ‘political’ as such necessarily exceeds the 
institutions that seek to organise and regulate it, just as, from another direction, civil 
society necessarily exceeds the political society that attempts to impose meaning upon it. 
If the political represents the ‘consciousness’ of the supposedly ‘non-political’ or civil 
society, the state apparatus functions as the moment of ‘self-consciousness’ of the 
political itself (Thomas, 2009: 189). 
In this way the state apparatus is a supplement to the naturally fragmented entity of civil 
society, ‘naturally fragmented’ because it is based on capital accumulation and atomised, 
competing market actors.  
Gramsci contra Marx? The limits of integration 
It is here that a tension may be detected between Marx’s argument about the essential 
state–civil society antinomy and Gramsci’s notions of enwrapment (involucro) or 
dialectical unity. But the distance between the two accounts is bridged when the integral 
state is considered as always necessarily unstable, because a state based on an atomistic 
and internally divided civil society cannot ever fully overcome the logic of the 
fundamental social relations that produce those contradictions. At no point does 
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Gramsci accept the inverted existence of society as its essence; he repeatedly returns to 
Marx’s arguments from the 1859 Preface that capitalist relations of production remain the 
basis for all other developments, including those within broader civil society and political 
society (Thomas, 2009: 98). Gramsci’s insight is that the chaos of civil society (as it is 
produced and reproduced by the anarchic process of capital accumulation) can break 
through the political container in which it finds itself enwrapped and which seeks to 
neutralise its radical potential to disrupt, and even end, capitalist rule.  
For Gramsci, any initiative from below to win hegemony on the terrain of civil society 
cannot help but enter the terrain of ‘the political’, because it pushes against the 
enwrapment of civil society by political society and is comprehended in political terms 
(Thomas, 2009: 194). Thus, as soon as a social movement starts to contest bourgeois rule 
on the terrain of civil society, it will come into contact with political society and the state. 
In examining the rule of the bourgeoisie in capitalist society, a distinction is being drawn 
in this paper between that class’s social rule in civil society (rooted in its dominance in 
social relations of production which Gramsci sometimes described as ‘economic’ 
relations) and its political rule (through the institutions of the modern state). The question 
is, therefore, to what extent can political society enwrap and ultimately incorporate non-
ruling social groups in its projects?  
The Prison Notebooks developed detailed historical accounts of how opposed processes of 
contestation and integration have played out in a variety of societies, but especially in 
Italy. Gramsci was particularly interested in various civil society organisations—whether 
explicitly ‘political’ or not—which played their parts in these processes. He chiefly 
examined overlapping epochs of rising and consolidating mass politics, stretching from 
late 1800s to when he was imprisoned. This gave him an historical substrate from which 
to draw conclusions that went beyond what Marx could theorise in his lifetime. Marx 
lived in an age where the infiltration of civil society by political society was relatively 
limited, and where (as an important example) direct representative institutions based on 
the working class were virtually non-existent. Thus, in Marx’s time, the antagonism 
between the state and civil society was less obscured by the complex (and organic) 
institutional connections that developed between them with mass politics. For Marx and 
Engels, the need to understand how organisations such as trade unions and workers’ 
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parties could become incorporated into bourgeois rule was not as clear as it later became, 
especially with the role of the social democratic parties in defeating revolutionary 
movements after World War One. In this, Gramsci was consciously following in the 
footsteps of Lenin, who was forced to rethink Marxist political perspectives and renovate 
received Marxist theory in the wake of the capitulation of most of the Second 
International parties to their national war efforts (Harding, 2009). 
The analysis so far has reflected on a conception of the state and its relationship to civil 
society that draws chiefly on the work of Marx and Gramsci. This analysis emphasises 
Marx’s conception of the state as both abstracted (separate) from, and antagonistic to, 
the civil society from which it emerges. Further, it incorporates Marx’s theorisation that 
civil society’s nature—its atomism and internal competition—arises from the abstraction 
of value within capitalist social relations of production. Gramsci subsequently elaborated 
and extended Marx’s basic critique, in order to analyse later developments in the 
relationship between the social and political spheres. In particular, Gramsci analysed how 
the growth of mass politics led to the further enwrapment of civil society by political 
society in the form of an integral state, and how civil society thereby became further 
incorporated into processes of bourgeois political rule.  
The state-civil society relationship and anti-politics  
If Gramsci is the Marxist theoretician of mass politics par excellence, the more recent rise 
to prominence of the phenomenon of anti-politics calls into question the continuing 
relevance of his insights. In the era of mass politics in the advanced capitalist West, for 
most of the 20th Century, formations such as trade unions and membership based 
political parties, alongside broader citizen engagement in electoral processes and the 
state, allowed an incorporation of the social (i.e. of civil society) into the political process. 
The current era is marked precisely by a breakdown of these institutional structures, 
which previously facilitated the complex and profound imbrication of statal and political 
imperatives with living civil society groups and blocs. Put another way, the separation 
and antagonism between social and political interests that Marx theorised, and as 
outlined above, is in the process of becoming the dominant form of state–civil society 
relations again. The integration or enwrapping that Gramsci called attention to in his 
concept of the integral state is now eroding. 
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Anti-politics is understood as popular detachment from, distrust of, and contempt for 
political elites and their activities (Burnham, 2014; Flinders, 2016; Hay, 2007; Mair, 2013). 
The phenomenon of anti-politics is increasingly recognised in mainstream debate, and 
has emerged, in various forms and levels of intensity, across the advanced capitalist 
countries over the last thirty years. Peter Mair, in his posthumously published Ruling the 
Void (2013), surveyed the state of politics across the European Union and concluded that 
across a wealth of empirical data—voter turnout, party allegiance, electoral volatility, 
party membership, and membership of civil society organisations such as trade unions—
there has been an unmistakable trend towards popular disengagement from politics. In 
advanced capitalist countries fewer citizens are voting and engaging with political parties, 
voting patterns are increasingly volatile, and distrust of political elites is on the rise. 
Citizens are less partisan to traditional political parties, and although recent economic 
chaos has accelerated these processes of decline, the phenomenon long predates the 
current era of ‘austerity’. In many ways anti-politics predates the neoliberal period in 
general, although the phenomenon has accelerated in that period. 
It is useful to conceive of anti-politics as having three distinct but related expressions or 
aspects (Tietze and Humphrys, 2015). Firstly, there is the prevailing popular mood of 
detachment from, and hostility to, politicians, parties and the political process—including 
radical forms of politics. This expresses itself in short-lived bursts of protest, electoral 
volatility and political crisis, but tends to dissipate if not given direction. Secondly, there 
are political projects from across the ideological spectrum that trade on an appeal to this 
mood for their own political ends. And thirdly, there is the social revolution that Marx 
and Engels argued would end the state—and therefore end the existence of a separate 
political sphere—which they considered uniquely characteristic of modern, capitalist 
society. They described this variously as ‘the real movement which abolishes the present 
state of things’, ‘revolution against the state’ and ‘communism’ (Marx, 1975b; Marx and 
Engels, 1976).1 
This mood is expressed in the United States by figures like Donald Trump, who 
successfully campaigned for the Presidency against the entire political establishment after 
                                                 
1 This third aspect is only noted here given it is not the focus of this paper, and there have not been significant 
social formations engaged in such activity in recent years.  
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staging what was (in effect) a hostile takeover of the Republican Party, against the wishes 
of most of its elite members and donors. A similar mood expressed itself in the UK’s 
referendum on membership of the European Union, where voters rejected the stance 
shared by the vast majority of the country’s political class and mainstream media 
(Inglehart and Norris, 2016). On the Left parties like Syriza in Greece and Podemos in 
Spain have related to this sentiment, mobilising widespread disenchantment with 
politicians and the political process into new formations promising to ‘do’ politics 
fundamentally differently. In the case of Spain, Podemos was an anti-mainstream party 
of the Left built on a wave of anti-political sentiment in the 15-M or Indignados 
movement (Ramiro and Gomez, 2017). A key slogan of Podemos was ‘No nos representan’ 
(‘they don’t represent us’). In a brief burst of national popularity, the comedian and 
activist Russell Brand was a progressive expression of this sentiment in the UK. It is also 
expressed in less ideologically coherent populist formations like Beppe Grillo’s Five Star 
Movement in Italy.  
Authors have theorised these changes, movements and expressions in various ways. John 
Keane (2009) argues that changes in the contemporary period are about profound shifts in 
the nature and institutions of democracy, to a new historical form of ‘post-representative’ 
democracy. Similarly, Simon Tormey (2015) views the current crisis of politics is part of an 
epochal transition within modernity—from one form of representation to another. Colin 
Hay’s explanation in Why We Hate Politics (2007) is that the phenomenon is about a shift of 
popular participation in politics away from governmental sites to wider yet less formal 
locations. For Mair (2013), meanwhile, the process is about the long-term withdrawal of 
political elites from popular accountability through the construction of institutions that 
shield them from democratic control.  
However, in examining anti-politics through the framework developed in this paper, one 
might argue that these approaches to the breakdown of politics get matters in the wrong 
order. That is, that the current crisis of politics and the rise of anti-politics represents not 
a contingent break from a norm of a stable politics, underpinned by deep roots in civil 
society, but rather that instability is the norm in capitalist society. This is a norm, 
however, which was partially reversed (or at least partially obscured) during a historically 
delimited era of mass politics centring on the 20th century. Thus, the rise of anti-politics 
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in the current period is a product of the breakdown of the political order that prevailed 
in many advanced capitalist countries for much of last century, an order whose historical 
transiency has now been become more apparent. While this has created space for some 
political projects of the left and right to take advantage of popular disdain for political 
elites, it has also thrown light on the more general relationship between the social and 
political spheres of modern capitalism.  
As such, this detachment is not caused by the political class being less ‘representative’ of 
their social base than in some previous era, but instead its lack of a social base makes the 
political class’s actual role in representing the interests of the state (and the political 
society around it) within civil society more apparent. The separation of the state from 
civil society creates the appearance of representation, one that masks the underlying 
social relations of domination. Marx and Gramsci help to illuminate that it is this 
appearance that is now breaking down, rather than a situation where inherently stable 
political structures are unexpectedly becoming disconnected from interests within civil 
society. On this analysis, social democratic political cohesion should not be taken as the 
norm from which we assess anti-political divergence in the contemporary period. Any 
Marxist analysis of anti-politics needs to explain not only why there is growing hostility 
to formal politics, but how the operations of politics have successfully ensured that this 
antagonism and opposition has been largely muted and eschewed for a prolonged 
historical period. To put it another way, a key question is not simply why anti-politics 
developed over the last decades but why we did not have it earlier. 
As noted above, politics exists as a separate—and alienated—sphere in modern, bourgeois 
society. As Santucci (2010: 156) explains, using Gramsci, the state is ‘only a forward trench, 
behind which there was a study succession of fortresses and madhouses’. Gramsci associates 
civil society with the ‘function of “hegemony” that the dominant group exerts over the 
whole society’ (ibid 2010: 156). The political party, as the ‘collective individual’, is the main 
instrument for the transformation necessary to realise a new hegemonic system—or indeed 
to maintain the present one. The period of mass politics was established on a base of mass, 
self-organised civil society organisations, including workers’ organisations and their 
connections with social democratic parties. In the breakdown of these structures, there is a 
breakdown of effectivity of political leadership of civil society. This includes electorates 
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rejecting governments, electorates looking to populists as old parties lose control over them, 
and an inability for trade unions to be agents of state-led macroeconomic reform. 
Simultaneously, there has been a rise of a socially detached political class whose internal 
struggles are less and less connected to what voters are concerned with. An analysis focused 
first on the separation of the state and civil society, and then their dialectical unity, provides 
a useful way to understand both anti-politics and the now-ended era of relatively stable mass 
politics in the advanced capitalist countries. 
Conclusion 
Marx’s argument that the relationship between the state and civil society was one based 
in antagonism, highlights how in a society based on capitalist social relations (the 
competition between atomised, particular, individual interests) results in a state and 
political sphere separate from those interests and with particular interests of its own—
rather than being a representation of some general or collective social interest. This 
explains why the ‘normal’ form of politics under capitalism is one alienated from a civil 
society already alienated from itself. Gramsci’s conception of the integral state allows us 
to understand how, in the era of mass politics, a dialectical unity of the state and civil 
society developed—where civil society was integrated under the leadership of political 
society. In this period, when social and labour movements acted (and highlighted the 
separation of the interests of the state and civil society) they were often incorporated 
within politics by the structures of politics—by the trenches and fortresses of the integral 
state, in Gramsci’s terms. With such organic ties between civil society and politics in 
place, even when radical movements challenging capitalism arose, it could appear to their 
participants that social change would more likely occur through political and statal 
channels rather than through their destruction. 
The tension between the positions of Marx and Gramsci (of antagonism and unity) was 
bridged by understanding moments and periods of integration as being always necessarily 
unstable. An antagonistic and divided civil society based on competition cannot ever 
fully overcome the logic of the fundamental social relations that produce those 
contradictions, but the structure of mass politics explains how those processes could 
be—temporarily—overcome. The combination of Marx and Gramsci’s insights can assist 
to identify the strengths and limits of integrating efforts made by the political sphere, and 
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the status of politics in capitalist social formations. Importantly, this highlights how the 
era of mass politics (through its material reality) allowed the state-civil society 
relationship to appear to have overcome its antagonisms. 
In relating and reconciling the approach of the early Marx (based in the empirical reality 
of his time) with that of Gramsci (based on the empirical reality of mass politics), this 
paper has analysed the relations evident in the decline of mass politics. Anti-politics was 
understood not as an all-embracing break from the past, but as a new moment 
underpinned by the structural features of the capitalist mode of production and the 
material contradiction evident in the state-civil society relationship. This analysis makes a 
contribution to a broader, necessary, project to develop a ‘Marxist theory of politics’—a 
framework that can deal with changes in the state-civil society relationship over time, as 
well as account for the contemporary rupture. By examining the state-civil society 
relationship in this way, we can explain both why anti-politics is more prominent in the 
last few decades and what material political structures broke down in order to make these 
antagonisms more apparent.  
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